provides a useful background to a new generation of mercenary soldiers to be found in Africa. More specific: "Particularly 'corporate mercenaries' ... at the behest of corrupt politicians and exploitative businessmen" receives attention 3 . To make use of a definition by Pech: "A corporate army is defined here as a privately owned military group whose finances, personnel and offensive operations, air wing division and logistic operations are all handled within a single group (not by a state -authors' insertion), or through inter-linked companies and enterprises. In its most basic form, it would be managed by a common pool of directors and have a small permanent corps of staff, serving its own commercial interests and those of affiliated entities." 4 Needless to say, that where the state becomes weak or faces disintegration such PSI/corporate security enterprises can step in on own accord, or when so requested by other instruments of big capital such as companies and/or multi-national corporations.
s They can act for example as hired armies that 'lessen the risks for petroleum and minet'al companies with business interests in resource-rich Africa'. As a modem manifestation (and quantitatively, though not qualitatively, different from earlier examples of organised mercenary outfits, i.e. the condottieri in Renaissance Italy and chartered companies in colonial Africa) of an older phenomenon they are positioned to act as the advance guard for new corporate empires. 6 "Private security in war-tom African states" the first chapter by Cilliers has to be read against the background of the suspended state (read: minimal or sub-optimum state) in Africa
7
• In various countries on the continent the African State due to the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism, indirect rule over natural and human resources needed and manipulated for Western (read: "Northern") consumption and the resultant monopolisation of power b~minority/majority groups became a rather fragile entity (if not outright explosive). In many cases these new 'states' failed to Cilliers in Cilliers and Mason, p.l.
Pech in Cilliers and Mason, pp. 83. For some background to mercenary activity and the scope for it in Africa, see a descriptive, somewhat less analytical, yet useful contribution by Christopher Clapham in Mills & Stremlau, 1999. Referring directly and indirectly to external (foreign) actors and their vested interests Clapham argues: "African security (and its corollary, insecurity) have in consequence not only be privatised, in the sense of being undertaken on behalf of some groups within the population, rather than (and at the expense of) others; it also have been commercialised, in the sense that it is heavily concerned with securing access to economic resources on behalf of people with the weapons". He also refers to colonialism: "As we have seen, this process goes back to the earliest era of European engagement with Africa, in the form of the slave trade and chartered companies. He continues: "Like privatisation, commercialisation operates on different levels of intensity". Abdel-Fatau Musah gives an example of how the "colonial imprint" followed by resistance against neo-colonialism resulted in 'state collapse'. See the part on the 'anatomy of state collapse' with specific reference to Sierra Leone (Musah, (78) (79) (81) (82) (83) .
Liberia, .Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Chad, Somalia and Ethiopia could be contemplated as some cases in point, albeit at different times.
generate or retain long-term legitimacy. What some termed the 'sus~ended state', others chose to refer to generically as the "collapse of the African state" .
Needless to say that access to and control over vital (or 'key-point') resources for western countries -or the elite that through indirect rule hold control over itremained (and still remains) the basis for exploitation of the continent, its wealth and its people. The pursuit of control over and extraction of production materials remained a primary goal of capitalist (ideologically referred to as "global") economies and hadlhas to take place with or without the African state. Also needless to say that if the mere mirage of a "State" as a nominal entity could be upheld, it facilitate(s) -the process immensely as the weak or nominal states provide the veneer of formality through agreements with western governments and/or multi-national corporations. Such formal agreements enable the inversion of exploitation-logic to be "marketed" as agreements or requests where extraction of resources is at stake.
From an Afro-pessimist perspective or from another (i.e. within the parameters of the current Renaissance/(Re) Awakening-discourse of Africa and earlier PanAfrican visions) this is cause for concern. With the exception of stable African states where constitutional governments rule, economies happen to be mixed and even growing and variations of democracy (adapted to the needs of people or the statepolity nexus),10 the state in Africa tend to be precariously weak or even disintegrating. II
In the aftermath of authoritarian rule, or minority rule/majority rule under one party systems or even kleptocracies, the military as the more effective bureaucracies in weak states stepped in as guarantors of the weak state (and sometimes as the visionary prophets hoping to bring about democracy)12. More recently in some Some examples here would be Egypt, Senegal, Namibia, Botswana and more recently Mozambique -and perhaps the 'new' Ghana. South Africa since the inception of democracy is a possible contender in this league. However the positive economic growth rate is still sub-optimum (part of this relates to the fact that low exports is taking its toll). Various social challenges also face the new government. These include widespread poverty, continuing job-losses attributable to South Africa's macro-economic restructuring program (GEAR), high crime rates, persistent white collar corruption (also within state bureaucracies), a skills drain due to emigration, tendencies towards (party-political) nepotism, uneasiness amongst segments of the South African population about minority rights (notably some elements within identity-groups such as the so-called "Coloureds", AfrikanerslBoere, the Jewish and Muslim people), etc. Hence it is too early to say whether South Africa will become a 'top contender' as a new democracy within in the world economy or whether it will run into problems of state legitimacy and delivery-failure due to the above.
Luckham aptly states: "Because of the increasing atrophy and decay of many African states, a rather different danger has arisen in the 1990s: namely that military revolts could tear down the entire politics not just regimes, ushering in civil war and political anarchy, as in Somalia or Liberia" (Luckham, R. 1995 Examples abound in Africa. [For the moment, we do not refer to Southern Europe or Latin America]. All these African countries were dependent on 'ruling economic cores' at the time when the military stepped in as autocrats, reformers, reactionaries or 'visionaries for democracy '-whatever they may have understood democracy to African states even the military disintegrated and due to lack of caracity and resources had to make way for entrepreneur-soldier outfits (PSI or PMC's). J Chapter 2 "Africa, military downsizing and the growth of private security industry" by P. Lock is interesting. An assessment is made of the subject by means of a comparative analysis of PSI, taking the histories of German military experts' involvement in China, Russian and US experiences of 'gated communities' 14. The latter represents direct oligarchic influence of private monopolist groups on the way of life oflocal elite's, or their substitutes. He notes, inter alia, that most actors worked towards forming homogeneous nation-states throughout the late 19,1h and early 20 th century. Instead, in the age of globalisation, control over commerce has become the key demarcation of political power, especially when t~ading in the global market (Refer to globalisation, should you so wish). Hence the nation state is forced into decline. "The classical nation-state may therefore be relegated to a back seat in the reorganisation of Africa's political economy and the ensuing new political map. The major powers are not likely to defend the territorial status quo provided their interests are not endangered by the changes" 15. Trade is a significant part of political economy, physical/material economy in particular. In view of the latter the major powers are interested in the maintenance of status quo, which is the precondition for "future development", (read: profitmaking or continued exploitation of available scarce resources held by resource-rich non-core states). One result being that instead of dispersing own forces, core states (industrialised/computerised technocracies) and global economic actors make use of qualified military professionals, no longer loyal to any goal but to current interests only (wealth, scarce resources such as minerals, 13 14 15 78 be. What is not too difficult to detect is the fact that the Huntingtonian theses of "political order in changing societies" played a major role (Huntington, S. P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. Huntington' major work on political order in 'developing' societies made great theoretical impact and were marketed widely for its pragmatic/utilitarian value. The robust advocacy of his work by scholars world wide (inclusive of some conservative South Africans) to the extent of political prescription. rather than prognosis made an even more profound -and in the long term negative -impact on so-called 'developing' (euphemistically called 'changing') communities. The imposed notion of order at all costs did play more than a small role in restraining the spread of democracy on the continent. (For an informative work on the military in politics, see Eric. A. Nordlinger. 1977 . Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc. Nordlinger divides praetorian interventions into three types. They are those officers that step into politics to moderate (moderators), to guard the status quo in view of lack of alternatives (praetorian guardians), and those that dominate the regime totally (praetorian rulers); pp 21 -27).
One has to add in a realistic vein that this is not only due to the ill preparedness of post-colonial independent states to tackle development and state building challenges. Nor is it only the result of the criminalisation of the state that some European observers such as Jean-Francois Bayart and Stephen Ellis are trying to argue. It also is a partial result of the top-down inflicted Structural Adjustment Programmes energy resources, water and food, etc.). Over Africa and elsewhere, PSI's are increasingly becoming a presence. Some may critically ask whether they are just beneficiaries acting in unison with "corporate peacemakers" or dangerous 'dogs of war,.16
Historically, being a warrior is a way of life, a hierarchy among six other fundamental hierarchies. It is both a social 'identity' and 'a profession' (note however, there are many military professions). According to the tradition, the soldier or warrior (Afrikaans: krygsman/mens) should be limited psychologically and legally: not to take up arms against his/her own collectively installed authority and the population who are taking care o/him (or her). 17 However, in the case of PSI, a 'multi1?il1ion dollar business', is closely linked to the concept of 'turbulent countries' 18. This'link forms 'a vicious circle' of violence in Africa dating back to the early sixties. III prepared African States became hastily independent from colonial powers. Given their underdevelopment through earlier exploitation bl industrial colonial masters such as Britain, Belgium, Germany, France and Portugal 1 two weaknesses haunted them: lack of economic development and lack of an integrated polity -and hence a self sustaining civil society or civil community. The latter was mostly due to earlier decisive "indirect rule" and manifestations of .. " TIris piece of oral story through music was lyrically descriptive and hardhitting realistic during the 1980s. But it became even more prophetic for the 1990s and 2000s in Africa. Thus the Scatterlings begot a universal meaning -something not foreseen by political scientists from a rich and Euro-centric "first world" when they myopically advocated and marketed 'political order' in changing/developing societies. On South African political scientists that advocated the "Huntington-thesis" one may be less forgiving. The consequences were to be foreseen, but the thesis was pushed for political gain and short-term maintenance of privileges.
While we admit that there are many traditions and hence many defiilitions of the 'professional soldier', ideally the soldier or military person serves the community in which he/she was brought up. Limits to their involvement are set by legal and institutional norms, and/or a set value system that in turn depends on structures of control as well as negotiated norms and values (i.e. to serve the constitution or the collectivity of citizens), For this reason Heinecken, a South African scholar, argues with reference to professional soldiers. (within a democratic (nation) The reader poses the gravity of the situation in Angola, Sierra Leone and the neighbouring countries, where the involvement of international military formations and PSI as peacekeepers proved to be of little avail. (See for example, Chapter 8 by S. Cleary "Angola -a case study of private military involvement" as well as Chapter 3 by M. Malan "The crisis in external response,,).23 A number of Western countries, while promoting the idea of 'privati sing" peacekeeping ... failed to provide a viable recipe for Boutros-Ghali's ill-conceived concept of 'peace enforcement,24. On the other hand, " ... there is no place for sale of private services which encoura~e one side, or the other, to believe it can benefit from further violent military clashes." S Chapter 7 by Alex Vines "Gurkhas and the private security business in Africa" dwells upon the activities of a specific PSI unit (Gurkha Security Guards -GSG) where soldiers from Nepal and Britain were enlisted. GSG is a privately owned British Company. During the 1990s they operated amongst others in Angola, Originally the Gurkha brigades from Nepal were modelled somewhat like the French Foreign Legion. They have a military tradition of professional soldiering covered by a decades long tripartite treaty between Britain, India and Nepal and earn hard currency for a rather poor Nepalese government. Following failed monetarist approaches in Britain (read: macro economic reforms through accelerated privatisation), many were left jobless.
27 Security outfits stepped in scooping up the trained but now jobless, Gurkhas -amongst them GSG. Implicitly Vines warns against the danger that the Gurkhas, despite a proud military tradition, may end up being blamed for mercenary adventures rather than the countries or companies they are called upon to defend. Abdel Fatau Musah argues that private security involvement in Sierra Leone has always been linked to mining operations. 28 Through the British weapons manufacturer J & S Franklin the ruling junta in Sierra Leone contracted amongst others Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) to provide security and protection for American-Australian mining concerns. Others were to follow. Amongst them Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African based security outfit. On the level of practical involvement and efficiency Vines refers to GSG whose mine-cleaning services were helpful in Mozambique, Angola, but other protection services were unsuccessful in Sierra Leone 29 • Clapham (in Mills & Stremlau) is even less complimentary on the successes of the GSG-outfit in Sierra Leone, one may add.
Chapter 9 "Fighting for diamonds -Private military companies in Sierra Leone" by 1. Douglas, partly discloses the true motives why local clashes become 'externalised'.
To use Lock's terminology, in that country, but even more so in Angola: it is the control of scarce resources, which are the main object of dispute. No wonder that the staff of the Executive Outcomes (EO) and the "diverse range of hidden corporate, financial and political powers that fund their operations,,3o, whose activities K. Pech has studied well in Chapter 5 "Executive Outcomes -A corporate conquest", prefer barter payment or 'peace for diamonds'. "Where will the proliferation of the storm-troopers for the global mineral and oil companies bring us tomorrow?" Pech attempts an answer, that "already in 1998 and 1999, civil conflict has spread across Africa and started a transcontinental war". At the danger of speaking hyperbolically:
When one speaks of globalisation, one speaks of the globalisation of violence ... Andrei Pritvorov suggests that a fundamental contradiction be to be found here: "To a believer in God it is evident that solely the Almighty possesses the" mission to globalise; all others are sinners. To non-believers, the human experience indicates, that any attempt by a person or group at globalizing or world rule frustrates". The notion globalizing could perhaps here be compared to a "totalizing project" or Scientia Militaria -30( I) 2000
It is possible to expand by referring to Lord H. Kitchener's (and his critics) deep belief that the 'big business' was responsible for the Second Anglo-Boer War or South African War 32 . The Anglo-Boer War or South African War (1899-1901) was the first modem 'resource war'. At the time it centred around the world's 'gold rush' of the 'happy nineties', after the Bank of England has demanded more gold to provide for the maintenance of the gold standard already affected by excessive issuing of bank notes. That reminds one of a current global financial crisis (e.g. on financial 'manipulation, such as bringing printed money into circulation on behalf of kleptocratic leaders ') ... 33
To take an example from a different epoch: One might also refer to the statement made by former Nazi minister of armament,s, Albert Speer during his interrogation at Nuremberg in 1945 that, indisputably, the need for oil was the most important cause of the war against Russia 34 . While Speer, arguably understated the ideological causes~f the war, his statement does point out the role played :)y scarce resources and control over such scarce resources as an important reason for violent inter-state conflict.
1. Cilliers and J. Douglas are right while pointing out in Chapter 6 "The military Business-Professional
Resources Incorporated" presents new challenges. Also they point out the need for regulation and oversight. "This, of course, does not reduce the requirement for mechanisms designed to provide the checks and balances essential when analysing 'armed force' to foreign poIicy,,35. Pech refers to early manifestations of PSI's such as the condottieri (persons or groups) of highly 
82
"totalization" -a concept derived from Marxist-existentialist thought. As a conceptual tool it highlights the need to be aware that the freedom and dignity of human beings (Afiikaans: menslikheid) are undermined when "totalities" are imposed from above. Differently put: Ubuntu, the spirit and practice of together being (Afrikaans: medemenslikheid) is subverted by myopic totalisation (for mere economic needs). organised mercenary armies used to conquer rich and strategic neighbouring states on behalf of wealthy Italian City states during the time of the Renaissance.
Kandyba
36 By the way, the first PSI formation was established, equipped and deployed in South Africa as early as in 1895 by L.S. Jameson who represented C. Rhodes' British South Africa Company -the BSAC (or "Chartered Company). And it is in no way accidental that Lomho and De Beers, as part of the Anglo-American financial group,37 which are heirs to BSAC, are using PSI. It has indeed been used since more than a century ago. 38
The way the PSI is used is the subject of analysis in relation to many collapsed or semi-collapsed African states. However delegated leaders or leaders of local communities and in some cases self-appointed warlords are also using PSI, albeit to a lesser extent. R. Cornwell in Chapter 4 "The collapse of the African state" notes that "The world is afflicted by a growing number of intrastate conflicts, apparently of racial, religious and ethnic derivation. A growing number of civilians, as opposed to armies and security forces, are becoming involved in this violence, often for no obvious or In the interest of a more careful analysis we may qualifY this. Feudal norms of subordination/domination under the principle of 'mundiburdium' were combining to an extent both traditional and modernist material and psychological incentives. Incentives that related to an appeal of personal loyalty to a ruler or/and identitY, under which the newcomer decided to serve., See in Cillers and Mason, pp. 6, 7, 14 and 127. While Lomho, a multinational based in Britain, did not use mercenaries in Uganda when supporting the National Resistance Army (NRA), the company greatly benefited from later deals made with the new government. This is well summed up by Omara-Ottunu. They state: "(Lomho and Tiny Rowlands), whose business activities have become reminiscent of the undertakings of the nineteenth-century merchant baron of the British Empire, Cecil Rhodes -supported the NRA in order to further his networks of global interests in Africa ... " These networks of interests included gold fields in Ghana, diamond fields under Unita and Savimbi's control in Angola and copper/cobalt mines, coffee production plants in pp. 411 clearly articulated political reason,,39. But how the escape from existing calamities and whereto in the future? It evidently for Cornwell, lies in the hands of a tiny faction of the African elite (and the affected communities). They will have to devise ways and means to creatively combine local and external influences of the past and present to restore order in their respective (democratic nation-) states by assuming positive visions of life, followed by practical solutions. Cornwell suggest amongst others, education (including re-education of the military professionals) and promoting development projects.
Cornwell's analysis unfortunately is extremely limited. He fails to address the role of intergovernmental relations, foreign relations and civil-community initiatives in his work. Very little mention is made of mediation and.the role of diplomacy. The potential role of regional frameworks and ways and means to address the weakening state in Africa furthermore lack in his analysis. He also refrains from holding corporate institutions responsible for the facilitation of the commercialisation of security in already exploited states. This reflects a serious lacuna in Cornwell's analysis.
Of course, the international community's duty is to take part in that process, involving issues of private security. Y. Sandoz in his article 10 "Private security and international law" is presenting views on PSI from a retrospective of discussions at the UN and OAU on the legal statuses of combatants, mercenaries, etc. He notes, inter alia, that "there is nothing to prevent lawmakers from prescribin<f a more severe penalty for a foreign combatant motivated by the prospect of gain',4 . But one should note that the moral distinction between both lies not in 'gain' itself, but as it was said above, in the nature of the warrior -either serving a national goal or merely an interest on behalf of him or herself or corporate or global capital interests. And in this light the author is right in questioning whether PSI is able or unable to "assume some of the responsibilities incumbent on the state,,4I. Lastly, 1. Cilliers and R. Cornwell in Chapter I I "Africa -from the privatisation of security to the privatisation of war" dwell upon the extension of armed conflicts in Africa, especially in its Sub-Saharan part, where of 42 countries, a third are involved in hostilities. They note, that " .. .large multinational corporations do not want to be associated with political conflict in their political environments and have every reason to end such conflicts" [Should have every reason -authors insertion)42. "It does seem evident, however, -the authors conclude, -that companies and entrepreneurs -if they can command reliable private military assistance -will be in a better position to negotiate concessions than other businesses without such connections" (p.229). That is perfectly true.
But, in order to negotiate wider and with more confidence, then, as an exception, and presuming that they are really willing to put an end to the spread of the continental and world-wide disaster, business organisations will have to form, something like a "Business United Front" or BUF. They will have to come out into the open as a moral political force. For example they will have to act as if they were a body of citizens of the host countries, where their enterprises are operating and act as if they view the affected communities in the host countries as equals or at least the 'dignified other'. That this will not happen is more likely. Profits continue to be made in war or peace by multinationals and corporate finance institutions. Furthermore multinationals are likely to claim that they cannot interfere in the affairs of states because they are not states themselves. 43 Perhaps it would be more realistic to think about strategies and tactics that can be deployed in the international arena (inclusive of international law) to ensure that business and multi-national conglomerates cannot make use of such PSI's. Perhaps the time has come to start a debate within the United Nations and the non-aligned Movement (NAM) on how 'to enact such regulations and how to enforce them by means of optimum sanctions against transgressors.
The argument made by Adrian Louw in developing his LLM-Thesis that Trans-national corporations and multi-national companies be legally held responsible for involvement with Private Security Outfits in furthering their profits to the detriment of people should be further explored. The question can be aptly asked "Why should states that are diminishing in autonomy be held responsible for (and they should be, we argue) while multi-national companies bent on profit making against the rules of human dignity (i.e. through involvement with PSI-outfits), not be held responsible by internationallawT M This will ask for a debate on the interpretation of and possible revision of international law.
Another option may lie in the strengthening of continental and regional security frameworks and agreements inclusive of confidence building and the strengthening of joint initiatives to enable peace keeping/peace enforcement and secure peace building by African states, hinted at by Olonisakin.
45
For states with huge socio-political challenges and lack of resources this may well seem to be an arduous task to establish such systems of regional and continental control.
The book, for which the editors, authors and technical editor gave so much time and effort, deserves praise. Experience and expertise is evident in its chapters. Students, researchers, politicians, departmental officials, military practitioners, business people, citizen force members and others, who allow themselves the leisure to read it, will look at the surrounding world and at their own role in it from a new perspective.
This publication has started an important genre in research around privatisation of war in South Africa. It is indeed strongly recommended reading for those interested in (human) security. Olonisakin in Musah and 'Kayode, pp. 233ff.
